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Abstract
This essay examines the unwillingness of nation-states to use physical force in response to cyber 
warfare. Specifically, the paper claims that uncertainties regarding international law, state 
sovereignty, definitions of the use of force, and the problem of attribution in cyberspace 
contribute to a state’s decision to forego responding to cyber-attacks by using physical force 
attacks in other domains (i.e., land, air, sea, and space). These concepts are considered within the 
framework of Neorealist theory and in reference to the literature on cyber warfare. The 2007 
series of cyber-attacks on Estonia are utilized as a case study to further examine the above 
elements. This paper builds upon the growing body of literature focused on cyber warfare and, in 
contrast to other research, argues that the international system’s inadequate handling of cyber- 
war concerns affects states’ responses to cyber-attacks by using physical force.
Introduction
Each day millions of acts of espionage, terrorism, and war are carried out across 
information networks (like the internet) around the globe. For example, in 2008 hackers 
attempted to penetrate the Pentagon’s networks 6 million times in a single day (Franzese 2009). 
And the cost to worldwide economic output is estimated in the tens to hundreds of billions of 
dollars each year (Cashell 2004). Though governments are typically able to cope with these 
cyber intrusions, the rising frequency and sophistication of attacks designed to damage systems 
and disrupt operations rather than steal secrets have caused much concern among security 
experts (Clarke and Knake 2010). A recent report by McAfee and the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies revealed that Internet-based attacks on critical systems are a growing threat, 
as attacks on gas, power, and water facilities have increased around the world (BBC April 18, 
2011). Using survey data from top executives in the industries that manage nations’ critical
infrastructure, Table 1.1 demonstrates that threats and vulnerabilities to cyber-attacks are 
growing while preparedness for such attacks has hardly improved (Baker 2011). The chart shows 
that the number of executives which report experiencing no cyber-attacks fell by 25 percent 
between 2009 and 2010. While a single attack equivalent to the wakeup calls served by Pearl
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Harbor or 9/11 has not occurred in the domain of cyberspace, many assert that the international 
community (including governments of individual states) lack the mechanisms and action plans 
necessary to respond to an attack that might cause even moderate physical damage to 
infrastructure or digital harm to sensitive stored information (Clarke 2009, 2010; Gable 2010; 
Jensen 2010; Kelsey 2008; Lewis 2010; McGavran 2009; Schaap 2009; Shackelford 2009).
A more traditional understanding of war between states and their militaries requires 
updating for the era of cyber warfare. Not only do the vulnerabilities of a state’s military matter, 
but also the vulnerabilities of the private firms and organizations which manage the nation’s 
critical infrastructure. For example, a cyber-attack needs not first defeat anti-aircraft defenses or 
outgun tanks on the ground in order to strike an enemy’s electrical grid. The seriousness with 
which we credit the threat of cyber warfare would increase many times over if nations fully 
understood that it is not their governments, with their significant resources and visible displays 
of military might that will be the first line of defense against the next major attack, but their local 
power companies and neighborhood banks. Cyberspace offers many channels through which an 
attack may arrive. And the vast majority of these channels are privately owned. Whereas nation- 
states in the past had to confront an opponent’s military before exercising its will over enemy 
territory and peoples, today it is possible for an enemy to bypass military defenses and strike at 
the heart of a nation.
States continually probe other state governments and non-state actors through cyber 
networks in order to gain information on the sophistication of a state’s electronic defenses. 
Though hard evidence on the source of attacks is often only partially available, a recent report by 
cyber security experts gives credit to the common belief among scholars that states are preparing 
for conflict:
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One of the more startling results of our research is the discovery of the constant 
probing and assault faced by these crucial utility networks. Some electric 
companies report thousands of probes every month. Our survey data lend support 
to anecdotal reporting that militaries in several countries have done 
reconnaissance and planning for cyberattacks on other nations’ power grids, 
mapping the underlying network infrastructure and locating vulnerabilities for 
future attack (Baker 2011).
And when cyber vulnerabilities become apparent, it is only a matter of time before they are 
exploited. In the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia over disputes in South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia, invasion by Russian troops came after a series of cyber-attacks on Georgian 
communications systems and websites (NY Times August 12, 2008). A year earlier Russian 
computers were used to shut down internet access across Estonia, perhaps as an early test for 
capabilities that were later used in full-scale war with Georgia. This is only one example of how 
states are “continually realizing, developing, and exploiting the potential power of cyberspace to 
influence, and respond to, the actions of other states” (Franzese 2009). Addressing the many 
uncertainties over how war may be conducted in cyberspace has thus become an important topic 
and challenge for governments and cyber security experts.
While the use of cyberspace as a battlefield is still in its infancy, state governments (most 
notably Russia, the United States, China, and Israel) have already begun to prepare for cyber- 
war. In October 2009 the U.S. military announced to the public a joint Cyber Command “in 
response to the already significant and growing digital threat” (ArmyTimes May 21, 2010). 
Though this announcement may have come as a surprise to the average citizen, it was something 
planned since 1995 as military officers and Pentagon officials contemplated the possible future 
role the internet might play in war (Clarke 2010). The vast potential benefits of the internet for 
global commerce and communication were predicted soon after its creation, and nations moved 
rapidly to adopt networks and information systems of their own during the ‘90s. Business, social
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interaction and communication, politics, and many other aspects of public human life have since 
been dramatically altered by the proliferation of computer networks. In the U.S. alone “the 
military uses over two million computers and has in excess of ten thousand local area networks” 
(Kelsey 2008, 1430). Increasingly the capabilities of state governments have become tied to the 
sophistication and size of their networks. Thus the growing value and importance of these 
networks have made them a high value target for states and non-state actors who wish to disable 
a network’s functionality in order to harm opponents.
One unforeseen consequence during the internet’s creation, which is now a 
dangerous reality, is the ability for nation-states to carry out cyber-attacks that have 
repercussions as damaging as physical ones. If a hostile government can cripple financial 
institutions, take utilities offline, bring down communication systems, and cause accidents which 
result in a loss of life, and do these things at a fraction of the cost and difficulty of using physical 
means, what need would they have for conventional war? One might argue that no state has yet 
demonstrated the ability to damage an opponent through data networks with the same level of 
effectiveness as through traditional military means, but there are no insurmountable barriers to 
prevent this from happening in the future. Many uncertainties remain over how future cyber wars 
may unfold beyond the limited way in which cyberspace has been used so far, but this paper 
explores which factors best explain nation-states’ lack of physical force response to cyber- 
attacks. This peculiar reality is important in trying to understand how the future of warfare may 
be conducted.
Will cyberspace remain a battlefield separate from the physical world, where an attack by 
an aggressor does not trigger physical retaliation? So far this seems to have been the case, and it 
is a curiosity that has not been known in previous conflict. How shall nation-states respond to
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cyber-attack? Can they accurately attribute blame for the source of an attack? When can a state 
military respond with physical force? Does cyber war even occur? What laws and organizations 
should govern war cyberspace? What types of physical damages are justified in going to war 
over (civilian lives, military installations, or buildings and infrastructure)? All of these questions 
are being asked by scholars and statesmen as cyber conflicts heat up around the globe. Although 
many of the conflicts in cyberspace fall under the categories of cyber espionage, cyber terrorism, 
or cyber-crime, cyber-attacks in this paper will be discussed in the context of cyber war. And 
while the tools of cyber warfare may be accessible to many non-state actors, this paper will focus 
on use of such tools by states.
Literature Review
Theoretical Framework: Neorealism and Realism
In order to better understand how the rise of cyber warfare has challenged the 
international system and the international relations theories that seek to explain it, this paper will 
consider cyber warfare in the context of realist and neorealist theory. Realist theory encompasses 
some one of the most influential ways of examining state behavior used by scholars and 
statesmen of the past several centuries. Several theoretical questions drove the inquiry of this 
paper and in selecting neorealist/realist thought as a tool for possibly explaining state behavior in 
cyber warfare. Some of these questions include: given neorealism’s focus on maintaining state 
security through treaties and international agreements, has the current body of international law 
been adequate in keeping nation-states from war? Does national interest of states according to 
realist theory prevent them from choosing physical force responses to cyber warfare based upon 
simple cost-benefit considerations? What then are the elements which states might consider as 
important in determining whether war is necessary? The final question led me to review
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literature based upon sovereignty, the use of force, and attribution. This paper shall summarize
here neorealist theory as it has evolved from realism; and it will later analyze each of the
elements which may justify the use of force in cyberspace through the neorealist lens.
Kenneth Waltz is considered one of the founders of neorealist theory in international
relations. Compared to the realist theories detailed by Morgenthau, “neorealism retains the main
tenets of realpolitik, but means and ends are viewed differently, as are causes and effects” (Waltz
1988). Power is not in itself always useful; states must strike a balance. Too much power held by
one state could invite smaller states to band together to resist its objectives or to attack. Thus, a
major revision made to realist theory by neorealism is that “the ultimate concern of states is not
for power but for security” (Waltz 1988).
The Neorealists, like the classical Realists, see the world as an inherently 
dangerous place as states inevitably must compete for power in a disorderly 
international system. But the Neorealists believe that threat of instability can best 
be constrained by a stable world order in which a small number of powerful states 
(ideally two—a bi-polar structure, the classic example being the world of the Cold 
War) limit potential conflict out of self-interest. Particularly important to such 
stability is open communications and as many agreements and treaties as can be 
signed (Barlow 2010).
Second, an additional important revision is that the structure of the international system, besides 
the motivations of individual actors, affects how states will behave. The possibilities one can 
expect from state interaction is “inferred from the assumed motivation of the units and the 
structure of the system in which they act” (Waltz 1988). Thus the wars that take place are 
explained partially by the structure of the international system, according to Waltz and the 
neorealists.
Neorealism has held a prominent place among scholars and intellectuals since the Cold 
War. By placing an emphasis on maintaining the world order, neorealism arguably contributed to 
preventing nuclear war (Barlow 2010). And while globalization and the end of bi-polarity has
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come to challenge neorealism, the prominence that neorealism has had through the 20th century 
makes it useful and relevant for considering cyber warfare. Neorealism may prove especially 
important given that it has provoked fear of catastrophe similar in the way the nuclear threat did. 
These above considerations will be important as this paper tries to explain state behavior in the 
age of cyber warfare.
This paper shall now turn to the major themes of the literature review to be considered in 
the context of the theoretical framework. Covered within the literature are definitions on the 
justifiable use of force, international laws and treaties such as the UN Charter, and the issue of 
sovereignty. These themes are important because of their widespread presence in the literature, 
and because of their applicability to this paper’s case study. All the themes are considered as 
they relate to cyber warfare and its unique challenges. After entering into an in-depth discussion 
on the arguments present in the literature behind why states use physical force, this paper will 
test these arguments against a case study to test their usefulness in a cyber-warfare scenario. 
International Law and the Use o f Force in Cyberspace
The study considers especially international law and the frameworks suggested by 
contemporary scholars on how to define the use of force in cyberspace. A traditional definition 
of the use of force would be an attack which threatens the territorial integrity or political 
independence of a state, and which does so using physical armed force to accomplish its end 
(Blake and Imburgia 2010).
The Use of Force
Accompanying the reevaluation of state security that occurs after any innovation in 
warfare, such as the atomic bomb or the events on 9/11, is a body of literature that attempts to 
define what constitutes an appropriate response to armed attack and when a state may retaliate
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with equivalent force. Cyber warfare is an innovation that has spurred on this discussion as had 
the previous innovations that made the air and the sea into battlefields (Clarke 2010; McGraven 
2009; Schaap 2009; Shackelford 2009). Understanding when a cyber-attack constitutes the use of 
force is important because it would clearly define when states may respond with their military 
and when with cyber-weapons. Leaving unanswered questions of how a state is to respond to 
cyber warfare creates uncertain conditions and “this uncertainty has the potential to then escalate 
tensions and intensify military operations beyond the cyber domain” (Schaap 2009).
In order to address the gap between current literature on the allowable use of force and 
the challenges presented by cyber war, some scholars have argued for an intent-based approach, 
determined by goals and outcomes (McGraven 2009). Such an intent-based approach would 
diminish the threat posed by the party who seeks to deface and disrupt government websites 
from the one which seeks to destroy or do severe harm to individuals. For example, shutting 
down internet services would be benign compared with risking citizens’ lives by shutting down 
power plants in winter. Such a view would consider as a main deciding factor in determining an 
appropriate response, the intentions of a state that initiated an attack. Others claim that such 
singular approaches fall short and instead propose that the intent of a cyber-attack against a state 
be considered as well as its damaging consequences (Schaap 2009). A definition that includes 
intent would help to distinguish between attacks which truly aim to cause serious harm from 
those which merely seek to annoy or cause mass disturbance (McGraven 2009). A definition of a 
justified use of force that includes intent would also help to rule out mere cyber intrusions or 
espionage from acts worthy of bombs and bullets. This could be best determined when 
examining the outcome of an attack. An attack that merely defaces a website is likely not worthy 
of physical retaliation in the way that an attack which disrupts critical infrastructure operations
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is. Critical infrastructure is taken to mean those systems, such as electricity and water treatment 
plants, which put lives at risk if they are disrupted or disabled.
The reason for the alternate approaches detailed above is that current international law 
simply does not fully account for the particular challenges presented by cyber warfare (Hollis 
2007). Some of the challenges that international law struggles to address include the problem of 
attribution and much of the definitions necessary for regulating cyberspace operations, such as 
the term cyberspace itself. Where does cyberspace begin and end? Defining these terms are a 
particularly difficult task, as developing an understanding for the new concepts of cyberspace has 
not kept pace with the development of cyber technologies (Todd 2009).
International Law
Given the literature’s limited treatment of cyber-attacks and the definitions surrounding 
them, other scholars have focused on how the current body of international laws and treaties 
should inform our understanding of cyber warfare and perhaps limit states’ ability for retaliatory 
action (Franzese 2009; Gable 2010; Kanuck 2010; Lewis 2010). A typical treatment of the 
question which asks when a state can respond to an attack with force might consider Article 51 
of the United Nations Charter and perhaps even NATO’s Charter. Article 51 of the UN Charter 
reads:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security (Charter of the United Nations, Article 51).
One may see upon reading the above statement that “armed attack” is something that must be
defined by the participants of war in each era. The writers of the UN Charter most likely did not
conceive of warfare that threatened a nation without the use of physical force in the strictest
sense. Thus in the established body of literature some scholars assert their own working
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definitions to remedy the ambiguity present in documents such as the UN Charter (Gable 2010; 
Kanuck 2010; Lewis 2010). Kanuck finds using international laws and treaties difficult because 
“the development of new technologies always presents difficulties for imposing limitations on 
the methods and means of warfare” (Kanuck 2010, 1588).
Universal jurisdiction is one example of how law may be used to determine physical 
force retaliation from cyber-attack justified. Universal jurisdiction claims that there is no place a 
cyber-attack can originate that makes the aggressor safe from prosecution or retaliation. Some 
argue that a case can be made for extending this principle of universal jurisdiction from treaty 
law and terrorism to cyber-attacks which are equally heinous in their outcome (Gable 2010). But 
others argue that such extrapolations based upon international law miss the fact that there is little 
agreement over even more fundamental questions of the framework through which we may 
understand cyber warfare (e.g. when does a cyber-attack constitute war?) (Franzese 2009).
Humanitarian law and principles of distinction are an additional consideration of scholars 
within the category of international law as it relates to cyber warfare. Cyber weapons do not by 
their nature discriminate against targets. Their dual use, against either military or civilian targets, 
has caused some to consider them akin to nuclear weapons (Kelsey 2008; Clarke 2009; 2010). 
Cyber-attacks of the most extreme kind could wreak havoc on civilian and military infrastructure 
alike, shutting down power plants, lines of communication, and disrupting travel. What arises 
might be a type of cyber deterrence where states resist using their cyber weapons against another 
state for fear of mass disruption, economic damage, and civilian casualties (Clarke 2010). There 
is less research on the subject of how humanitarian law and human rights affect a state’s decision 
to respond to cyber-attack with physical force. Kelsey (2008), however, claims that the principle
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of distinction, which requires belligerents to differentiate between civilians and combatants, will 
be the chief determinant in cases that hold a potential risk for higher civilian casualties.
Some scholars consider cyber warfare within international law by analogy (Hollis 2007). 
This approach considers past developments in technology in comparison to their legal treatment. 
“States have readily subjected prior “novel” developments in warfare—e.g., submarines, 
airpower, chemical and biological weapons—to legal regulation” and so it seems that cyber 
warfare will naturally follow (Hollis 2007). The Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions are used by advocates of the “law by analogy” approach to suggest “states 
frequently extend existing rules to new types of warfare by analogy” as was the case in making 
land and air warfare rules comparable (Hollis 2007). Is a 60 year old document the best way of 
understanding how cyber warfare will one day enter into official international laws and treaties? 
Even advocates of this approach admit that there is no way to know how or when cyber war may 
be included in the legal regime; it only provides a historical guide (Hollis 2007).
The Case of Stuxnet and Approaches by Analogy
Is it possible for cyber warfare to fit neatly within the current legal regime by analogy as 
simply a new weapon? This could be true if “[cyber-attacks] were used to cause physical 
destruction in the way bombs do today” (McGavran 2009). While the use of cyber-attacks for 
physical destruction is possible, it has yet to be a main or even significant way in which cyber- 
attacks are used. There is a prominent case where a cyber-attack seems to have caused physical 
damage, and that was the Stuxnet Worm which purportedly took Iranian nuclear centrifuges 
offline (Economist September 30, 2010). Let us expand briefly on this case and see if Stuxnet 
would allow cyber warfare to be considered a new weapon by analogy. The purpose of the 
following section is to illustrate the various arguments used by scholars to justify the use of force
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in traditional conflict, and through the Stuxnet example find the most promising ways to test 
cyber warfare and the case study.
In June of 2010 a Belarus security firm discovered a computer virus known as Stuxnet 
spreading across networks that targeted specific control systems, with a majority of the infections 
present in Iran (BBC News September 23, 2010). Much speculation and study of the virus took 
place in the following months. It was determined that the virus specifically targeted the 
centrifuge control equipment at uranium enrichment plants, but has so far only affected the 
Iranian Bushehr nuclear reactor. While the initial success of the attack was unclear, a shutdown 
of some type was verified later at the Iranian reactor and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency said in a report that Russian engineers had removed 163 fuel rods from the nuclear 
facility (BBC News March 4, 2011). Cyber experts have speculated on the creator of the Stuxnet 
“worm,” and declared the United States to be the most likely creator of the sophisticated attack 
given its interests in keeping Iran from developing nuclear weapons and its cyber security 
resources to develop Stuxnet. Thus Stuxnet was a cyber-attack which had physical consequences 
and affected a piece of critical infrastructure within the national interests of another nation.
My assertion that nation-states do not use physical force when faced with cyber threats 
because they are unable to justify the use of force in cyberspace, is not a blanket statement that 
states are generally timid and choose to wait for permission from international law. I am 
claiming that given the unusual conditions of cyberspace, an ambiguous classification of the “use 
of force” limits a state’s ability to clearly decide in favor of using physical force in response to 
cyber-attack. I make this claim based on the fact that “the determination of an act of aggression 
gives rise to potential collective action against the State under the U.N. C h a r te r ;” well as 
based upon evidence that classifying a new tool of war as a weapon “appears to make it more
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likely that its use against another State will constitute an act of aggression under General 
Assembly Resolution 3314” (Blake and Imburgia, 2010, 188-189). But as we saw in the example 
of the Stuxnet Worm, cyber-attacks have yet to be determined acts of aggression or new weapons 
under international law.
The consequentialist approach (which compares outcomes of cyber-attacks to the 
outcomes of past physical attacks) and analogy approach (which compares the process of 
attacks) attempt to explain cyber-attacks within the current body of laws, and according to 
scholars fail to capture what is considered a crucial element of cyber-attacks, intent (McGavran 
2009). Therefore, states lack at least one of the standards by which to independently determine if 
the use of force is justified, perhaps a contributing factor in explaining why nation-states do not 
use physical force when faced with cyber threats.
As has been shown, scholars have attempted to put cyber warfare within several 
definitions, such as consequentialist and analogy, which are used to justify the use of force for 
traditional domains of war. Would the Stuxnet example fit any of these approaches? The first 
approach declares that cyber warfare cannot justify the use of force (as an armed attack by a 
belligerent) because cyber-attacks are “materially different in form from the traditional, i.e., 
kinetic, forms of military action” (McGavran 2009). It is one which ties military coercion with 
physical characteristics (Kanuck 1996). This line of thinking believes cyber war is an exceptional 
case different from previous military conflict because of the non-physical aspect, although it has 
become clear that cyber war sometimes results in very physical consequences (as in the case of 
Stuxnet). One could look to the UN Charter for support of this idea, where Article 41 includes 
“complete or partial interruption of...telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication” as
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items where the use of force is not permissible (UN Charter 1945). In the case of Stuxnet its non- 
physical origins had physical results; something this first approach is unable to make room for.
The second approach attempts to justify the use of force in response to a cyber-attack 
based on whether an attack is able to gain access to important infrastructure in the same way as a 
physical attack. This approach is “target-based” which suggests “a use of force [constitutes] an 
armed attack whenever it penetrates ‘critical national infrastructure’ systems” (Hollis 2007). 
When considering Stuxnet in the context of this approach, it seems to fit quite well. Stuxnet was 
able to effectively penetrate the critical systems of the Iranian nuclear reactor quite well, though 
perhaps not as well as troops on the ground. After all, the access to the facility was only so 
extensive as to produce a disruption to uranium enrichment activities rather than a complete 
cessation. Further discussion is required as to what constitutes “critical national infrastructure” as 
it seems a largely subjective measure. And no matter what the final target of an attack, ultimately 
this distinction is interested in results of the attack.
And the third approach focuses upon the consequences of cyber-attack; the use of force is 
justified if cyber warfare produces the same type of damage as bombs and bullets or results in 
civilian casualties (McGavran 2009). In the Stuxnet example, a cyber-attack was able to sabotage 
the Iranian nuclear facility by a temporary disruption. But when Israel decided to use physical 
force against what resembled a nuclear facility in Syria, the site was bombed by warplanes 
destroying it entirely (BBC News April 25, 2008). These two outcomes are not the same. The 
Iranian reactor was not removed from the map by Stuxnet as the Syrian facility was by Israeli 
bombs in 2007. So the case of Stuxnet falls short of fitting these criteria as well.
The above approaches demonstrated that force could not be justified given a cyber-attack 
such as Stuxnet. The first approach which states the cyber and physical attacks are materially
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different never allows for a cyber-attack to justify any type of physical response and vice versa. 
This definition of the use of force will never be able to include cyber warfare if it requires cyber- 
attacks to be materially the same as an air strike. It does not allow for cyber-attacks to be a cause 
for war no matter their destructiveness (Hollis 2007, McGavran 2009). Imagine a second version 
of Stuxnet that results in the meltdown of a nuclear reactor, surely physical response of some sort 
would be justified. The second approach only allows an attack on the infrastructure deemed 
important to justify the use of force, whether the original cyber-attack is damaging or not. Severe 
damage done to infrastructure secondary in importance to the national interest does not justify 
the use of force in response. And the third is only useful in dire situations when one might as 
well be experiencing physical attacks. Thus an attack that disrupts like Stuxnet rather than one 
which destroys like a bomb does not justify the use of force in response. Each of these 
approaches leaves a state unable to justify the use of force under international law in the case of a 
cyber-attack which wreaks cyber havoc (McGavran 2009).
Thus the path to justifying the use of force in cyberspace and the appropriate response 
level under international law is hardly clear. An entirely new approach to understanding how the 
use of force may apply is needed, but until such an approach develops making the connection 
between a cyber-attack as an armed attack will remain difficult.
How might the Neorealist then view the effect of an absence of adequate international 
laws and treaties on how states behave when attacked? The interests of the state are primary. If a 
threat to those vital interests is posed by a cyber-attack or any other, then the state should not 
avoid war in protecting those interests. While international law would not take precedence over 
the interest of the state, ideally those laws are ones which further mutual state interests. 
Considering that Neorealism proposes the international order is maintained through establishing
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laws and treaties, it would be contrary to the theory for one to throw out those laws when war is 
threatened. International law remains an essential component for the Neorealist, who must 
balance maintaining order with protecting national interest. What the above discussion may 
reveal if neorealism remains influential among state decision makers, is that nation-states will 
now move to construct further international agreements on how to manage cyber-attacks because 
they believe security is maintained in part by laws and treaties are able to contain behavior. 
Sovereignty in Cyberspace
When the U.S. military set about developing a national strategy for operations in
cyberspace, the authors of the strategy acknowledged the problem of sovereignty in cyberspace
(Clarke 2010, 45). A government document produced by the U.S. Department of Defense on
American strategy in 2006 noted that “the lack of geopolitical boundaries...allows cyberspace
operations to occur nearly anywhere” (U.S. DoD 2006). Sovereignty is a key factor in how the
modern international system operates. And the new challenges that have arisen by placing
sovereignty in the context of cyberspace are important to consider if we are to understand how
nation-states will operate within it. Sovereignty is a defining feature of the state. A particularly
good definition of the many ways in which the term is understood today notes four central ideas:
Domestic sovereignty, referring to the organization of public authority within a state 
and to the level of effective control exercised by those holding authority; 
interdependence sovereignty, referring to the ability of public authorities to control 
transborder movements; international legal sovereignty, referring to the mutual 
recognition of states; and Westphalian sovereignty, referring to the exclusion of 
external actors from domestic authority configurations (Krasner, 2001).
In this study sovereignty is understood as the ability, indeed the necessity, of the state to remain
autonomous and in political control. The basis for this paper’s discussion of sovereignty lies in
the significant literature on the concept in international relations and illustrations of its
application drawn from international laws and treaties.
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An understanding of sovereignty in a traditional way faces a challenge from cyberspace. 
How is it that a state may control a realm whose feature is universal access? Specifically, 
“cyberspace tests a state's interdependence sovereignty because it challenges a state's ability to 
control transborder movements” (Franzese 2009). The borders that separate physical territories 
and divide individual states do not exist in cyberspace as they do in countries. An outside agent, 
whether a potential enemy or benign user, gains access to cyberspace which holds a state’s 
virtual assets because much of cyberspace is not unique to a state. The servers and infrastructure 
which support the cyber networks of a specific state do not lie only within that state’s territorial 
bounds. And these servers are accessible from outside a state’s territory. There are no 
impenetrable border controls.
Despite uncertainty about how to lay claim to sovereignty in the cyber domain, states do 
have some reasons for exercising sovereignty there. Such reasons include the ultimate physical 
dependence of cyberspace: the virtual landscape of networks and seemingly immaterial 
interactions require very physical investments in cables, computers, buildings, electricity and so 
on. The transactions that take place in cyberspace also require oversight and supervision. States 
assert sovereignty by governing the content that is produced there and restricting access. And the 
reality of events which take place in cyberspace is another cause for claiming sovereignty to 
exist in cyberspace: cyberspace activities affect the world beyond cyberspace (Franzese 2009). 
And there must be some agreement among states to govern business transactions and commerce 
which takes place there. Thus the laws of a state or international law do govern actions in 
cyberspace. But the ways in which states govern these cyber interactions are not yet on the scale 
of governance required for managing warfare. Despite the above state claims, there is not a clear 
path to claiming violation of state sovereignty in cyberspace which would trigger military
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conflict. The fact that states are lacking the laws and agreements which clearly define 
sovereignty in cyberspace, as has been done in other domains such as air and sea, lends support 
to the first hypothesis that a state will not use physical force if the extension of sovereignty in 
cyberspace remains unclear.
An Illustration: Sovereignty at Sea
Let us consider the development of state sovereignty on the sea as an example. The first 
recorded statement on the law of the sea was made by Roman Emperor Justinian I which 
“declared that the sea and its fish were available to all and no state could extend its jurisdiction 
beyond the shore...” (Buck 1998). Until the 17th century it was “anarchy, in which the strongest 
navy prevailed, [that] essentially ruled the oceans” (Franzese 2009). Following the 17th century, 
the rise of major seafaring powers around the globe with formidable navies introduced a balance 
of power and created a semblance of order. It was not until 1958 with the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea that sovereignty became defined through international 
agreement instead of based upon the power of states competing for influence. The Law of the 
Sea did such things as allow for the innocent passage of vessels through other territorial waters, 
require states to keep track of basic information on its vessels, and set up a forum for settling 
disputes (Franzese 2009). But cyberspace has yet to gain even these basic features. Even today, 
on the coastal waters of Somalia, we can see the uncertainty that results given the presence of 
illegal activity (piracy) when there is no clear extension of state sovereignty into a domain (VOA 
News April 8, 2009). States such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, and those from the 
European Union, struggle in coordinating who should exercise influence in the coastal waters 
that are unable to be controlled by a sovereign nation (Economist February 3, 2011). And 
because effective control is a key component of sovereignty beyond simply an agreement upon
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physical borders, Somalia does not have complete sovereignty of its waters if it cannot control 
them. The difficulty for states in determining how to proceed in exercising influence in the 
waters of Somalia, mirrors how states are unsure of the steps to take in asserting themselves in 
cyberspace. There is clearly an interest for states to maintain order and protect their assets in 
cyberspace, as there is an interest for them to prevent valuable trade from being pirated near 
Somalia. Yet without an international agreement on how sovereignty extends in territory without 
clearly defined borders, in cyberspace or otherwise, states will hesitate to exercise their own 
interests and will continue to operate in general disorder.
The uncertain application of sovereignty to cyberspace is an additional factor that may 
contribute to states’ reluctance to use physical force. Scholars who agree with the need to 
develop a framework regarding what constitutes war and the use of force, often suggest doing so 
based upon how state sovereignty should be understood in cyberspace (Franzese 2009; Lewis 
2010). They agree that the absence of sovereignty in cyberspace is a myth. Territory is necessary 
for the physical servers and infrastructure that allows for a cyberspace. Though the 
communication that takes place is virtual, the objects that make communication possible are very 
much physical and placed there by entities with an interest and goal in mind (Lewis 2010). The 
second subject discussed by scholars who claim sovereignty is important to understanding cyber 
warfare issues is with regard to the idea of the global commons. They claim suitable analogies to 
the development of cyberspace can be found in treaties that designate appropriate use and 
behavior for the sea, Antarctica, and outer space. Those domains faced similar uncertainty before 
the application of state sovereignty was detailed at length on paper. Each treaty, such as the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, specifically addresses sovereignty (Franzese 2009). And the 
absence of any international law that does the same for cyberspace leaves open the door for
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abuse through cyber-attack with no clear path for determining culpability. Perhaps bringing 
cyberspace into the global commons would resolve such uncertainties.
Even if the international community is able to answer questions regarding the definition 
of the appropriate use of force (whether it is rooted in sovereignty, international law, or 
elsewhere) the problem of attribution remains (Clarke 2009, 2010; Farwell and Rohozinski 
2011). It has become notoriously difficult to pinpoint the source of a cyber-attack from abroad. 
And even when one may definitively be able to know the origin of an attack, a government may 
always deny its involvement, instead choosing to blame organized crime or citizen hackers 
(Clarke 2010). Because retaliation requires knowledge of an attack’s source, states’ reluctance to 
use physical force in responding to cyber-attacks may stem partly from their inability to attribute 
blame to another state; this in addition to the lack of definition and agreement present in 
international law which specifies when retaliation is justified.
The Principle of Attribution
While the inadequacy of international laws and treaties in addressing the challenges of 
cyber warfare is based upon their age, there is a fact about the very nature of cyberspace which 
makes physical retaliation very difficult. That difficulty lies in attribution. Without certainty of 
the source of aggression, a state cannot respond with a physical military attack. This study 
defines the principle of attribution as being able to know the originator, intent, and severity of a 
cyber-attack (Todd 2009). It is more than simply pinpointing the source of a cyber-attack, though 
origin is central to the concept. The absence of any one of the above criteria weakens the extent 
to which an attack may be attributed.
States may be seeking greater control over cyberspace, but the individual entities which 
carry out cyber-attacks remain largely invisible. The state-sponsored cyber hacker, for example,
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can “operate without borders, explicitly refusing to obey any parameters a state may have erected 
for law-abiding citizens” (Gable 2010). While it is true that there is a clash of interests between 
the rule seeking state and the borderless cyber hacker, for all intents and purposes the capabilities 
of each are the same. It is true that greater resources, including money and expertise, equal a 
more capable and successful cyber-attack. Cyber warfare is not an activity exclusive to the state. 
The wealth of a treasury may be necessary to maintain an army and a Manhattan Project required 
for developing an atomic bomb, but the cost of conducting a cyber-warfare campaign is 
incredibly cheap relative to all other forms of warfare in the modem era. Computer hardware and 
technical knowledge are widely available today, in stark contrast to the handful of scientists that 
brought the world into the nuclear age. The computers that might be used for cyber war are 
located all over the globe, as part of botnets (see glossary), and within many different states.
Each of these computers may be concealing its identity by acting as if its user were somewhere 
else. In short, the individuals who execute a cyber-attack are able to conceal their identities in so 
many ways as to make divining their ultimate location extremely unlikely, though technically 
possible. And even if all signs lead to a particular nation-state, the government may deny its 
involvement. Thus even in situations with the best evidence for apportioning blame to a specific 
aggressor, there is no real certainty as there would be with troops or missile launches. The only 
options for retaliation and self-defense left to a state are counter cyber-attacks or to risk starting a 
conventional military conflict with a state that may be blameless.
That cyber warfare is so available to non-state actors to be used as a tool in 
accomplishing their goals, does not mean that this paper’s theoretical approach focused upon 
state behavior is invalid. Traditional warfare such as bombs and AK-47s are available to 
terrorists and also to states. Yet there are theories of terrorism in international relations which
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seek to explain the non-state actor’s behavior separate from theories such as neorealism which 
seek to explain state behavior. Non-state actors’ access to increasingly powerful tools of 
traditional warfare has not diminished the credibility of theories which focus upon state behavior. 
When non-state actors enters the fray, they do not cause states to cease from acting like states.
The just war theorist Michael Walzer acknowledges that war may “break out, like an 
accidental fire, under conditions difficult to analyze and where the attribution of responsibility 
seems impossible” (Walzer 2006). As uncertain as the start of a war may be (we could imagine a 
scenario in which neither side knew who initiated the attack) the initial uncertainty disappears to 
the point of irrelevancy once war begins. The challenge of attributing blame for each gun battle 
or air raid is not on the same level as the challenge posed by cyber-attacks. Following an initial 
uncertain cyber-attack could follow wave after wave of subsequent attacks, and the entire 
conflict could conceivably take place with one state unaware of its attacker. However, a 
traditional ground, air, or sea war taking place where two states are never able to identify the 
other at any time during or after the fighting is nearly unthinkable. For this reason, the problem 
of attribution is one that has become unique to cyber warfare and holds significantly different 
meaning than when considered in the context of traditional physical attack.
Neorealism is affected by the problem of attribution in cyberspace and strategies must 
shift to accommodate the asymmetric nature of cyber war in comparison to traditional warfare.
In maintaining the international order, states have not previously had to question whether a major 
conflict took place. The ultimate source of a cyber-attack has proven nearly impossible to 
ascertain (this point is discussed more in depth later on). Thus cyber war has emerged as a very 
asymmetric capability (a capability which favors actors with fewer resources using non- 
traditional means of military power), like terrorism. Less developed nations with weaker
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information technology systems and cyber infrastructure are less vulnerable, like North Korea, 
yet still can maintain a relatively significant offensive cyber capability. States with greater 
resources may be more powerful militarily, but they also have more at stake if cyber war occurs. 
Since 1945 the emphasis has been on offensive capability rather than defensive, “the ultimate 
Neorealist peacekeeping strategy since then has been to ensure not that one could survive an 
attack, but that no aggressor could survive a counter-attack” (Barlow 2010). The international 
order’s preoccupation with overwhelming offensive power to deter conflict is now being 
challenged by the nature of cyber warfare. Neorealists such as Clarke and Knake have so far 
asserted that the possibility of “going kinetic” is real in the case of cyber-attack (Clarke and 
Knake 2010). But this outcome does not realign the balance of power in the international order 
which has shifted with the introduction of cyber warfare. Destruction of information systems 
cannot be mutually assured as was true during the Cold War. One cannot monitor cyber-weapons 
capability in the way that the U.S. monitored Russian nuclear launch sites. Thus, the ability to 
prevent cyber-attack has more value today than the ability to launch an attack, a radical change 
for the neorealist.
If one subscribes to the neorealist point of view and agrees that the international order has 
become unbalanced, it may help to partially explain the existence of cyber-attacks in the first 
place. Because there is no overwhelming cyber offensive capability to deter states from using 
cyber warfare, and because most attacks are not attributable, the attacks will continue 
unimpeded. Given the over emphasis placed upon offense, defense against asymmetric attack is 
lacking. The balance of power that the Neorealist uses to maintain order is off, so it should be no 
surprise to him that cyber skirmishes occur between states unchecked. This imbalance is evident 
in that deterrence does not work in cyberspace. There is no guaranteed retaliation for escalating
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conflict as in the days of mutually assured destruction (MAD). Therefore there is some clear 
value in testing out an opponent’s capabilities and defensive measures if one can do so 
anonymously.
These challenges posed by attribution are difficult, but not insurmountable. Our current 
understanding of attribution is based upon contemporary capabilities in technology. Much like 
the fog of war was lifted with the invention of radar and the new ability to track aircraft, or 
similarly sonar underwater, perhaps tomorrow a similar capability will become apparent which 
makes attribution much easier than it is today. Cyberspace still enjoys an advantage in its 
newness. But given appropriate time and resources the hard problem of attribution today may 
very well be entirely different one tomorrow. Other scholars share the view that technology may 
make attribution possible in the future (Carr 2009). Thus it is necessary to consider other 
elements which may help to explain the absence of a physical force response by states faced with 
major cyber-attacks, such as sovereignty’s extension in cyberspace.
Research Method
The ultimate goal of this paper is to shed light on why states have not entered into 
physical conflicts with one another after they were first engaged in cyber conflict; and though the 
current body of literature on cyber warfare has not answered this question, it has informed this 
study. The following research questions were developed in response to the discussion of 
arguments by scholars on traditional warfare cyber warfare.
Q1: Why does a nation-state’s use of cyber warfare tactics against another state not result 
in the use of physical force by the attacked state if the extension of sovereignty in cyberspace 
remains unclear?
24
Though not every violation of state sovereignty may result in the use of force, there is a 
historical basis for considering violation as a guide for action as Franzese points out (2009). The 
1960 incident in which the Soviet Union shot down an American U-2 spy plane is an illustration 
of how states may apply sovereignty to less clearly defined domains. The altitude at which the 
U-2 was able to fly was much higher than previous spy planes, which forced nations to question 
how far their territorial airspace extended above the earth. Because the Soviet Union decided to 
define the airspace where the U-2 was located as essential to its national security and an 
extension of its sovereignty, and the American plane’s presence as a violation of those principles, 
it used physical force to uphold its sovereign rights (Franzese 2009). Thus the first hypothesis 
builds off of the idea that states will seek to extend sovereignty to areas essential to their national 
interest, like cyberspace. Yet due to uncertain definitions of how state sovereignty is extended in 
cyberspace, states are so far unable to justify physical retaliation based on this characteristic 
alone. The first research question moves to draw another conclusion from the assertion by 
scholars that states use physical force partially because their sovereignty is violated, i.e., if 
sovereignty is not clearly violated, then perhaps states will not move to use physical force.
Q2: Why does a nation-state’s use of cyber warfare tactics against another state not result 
in the use of physical force by the attacked state if definitions on the use of force in international 
law remain undetermined?
Some scholars have asserted their own definitions of the use of force as it relates to cyber 
warfare, acknowledging that the current international system has failed to be useful as a guide for 
state action in cyberspace (Hollis 2007; Kanuck 2010; McGavran 2009). This paper’s second 
research question makes the further move that because of the lack of definition on the acceptable 
use of force, states cannot base a physical force response on this principle of war, and yet one
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more path for physical retaliation is unavailable for states to legitimately take. This second 
research question was developed with the idea that states prefer to operate within accepted norms 
and through an agreed upon framework rather than as independent agents. Balance of power 
theory in international relations suggests that a state would not wish to act unilaterally for fear of 
the unifying effect that action would have upon rival states (Chatterjee 1972).
Q3: Why does a nation-state’s use of cyber warfare tactics against another state not result 
in the use of physical force by the attacked state if the attacked state is unable to attribute blame 
for the attacks to a particular source?
The challenge of determining the source of an attack is so difficult that some have 
asserted states under cyber-attack are unable to consider a full range of options, including 
physical retaliation, as a response to cyber conflicts (Todd 2009). But the ambiguity of 
attribution has not prevented some nations, such as the United States, from envisioning “the need 
to bomb things in the physical world to defend against cyber-attack” (Clarke 2010, 46). States 
have yet to respond with physical force because of a cyber-attack. And claims that states may yet 
lash out with physical force ignore the blatant reality that attribution is almost never able to be 
given to a single physical location. Will states really choose to attack blindly? Thus the third 
research question takes advantage of the obvious fact that states cannot attack what they cannot 
target.
This paper applies the above research questions on cyber warfare to the particular case of 
“Web War I,” which took place in Estonia in 2007. The case is especially useful for this paper’s 
discussion of cyber warfare as it relates to nation-states, since it was the institutions of the state 
that were attacked rather than other entities. Using the answers from the literature on why states
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do not respond with force, this study seeks to discover if those same explanations hold true in the 
case of cyber warfare specifically as related to the case of Estonian cyber-attacks.
For the purposes of this study, a major cyber-attack is defined as one which severely 
threatens a state’s national interests, including its citizens, critical infrastructure, and military 
capabilities. Major cyber-attacks were measured in this way because of the need to distinguish 
them from relatively minor attacks by non-state actors that seek to deface or merely disturb the 
cyber operations of a state for limited gains. Major cyber-attacks are ones in which states execute 
upon one another in order to achieve political objectives within the greater national interest. The 
study uses the term physical force in contrast to cyber-attacks. Attacks may either by cyber or 
physical; and physical ones are defined by those which do not use electronic signals to alter 
internal processes of computers. The traditional conception of bombs, troops, and tanks as what 
constitutes physical force is adequate for the purposes of this paper.
So far this paper has entered into a fuller discussion on the elements of attribution, 
international law and the use of force, and state sovereignty as they each apply to cyberspace.
The challenges of responding to a cyber-attack using physical force have been developed. But let 
us now consider a case study in which the previous points are more fully illustrated; and this 
study shall endeavor to see if states’ reluctance to respond with physical force to a cyber-attack 
can be explained by the above elements.
Case Study: Estonia and “Web War I”
In 2007 Estonia experienced what has come to be known as Web War I, so named 
because of the profound implications of this cyber conflict. Never before had a nation 
experienced such a coordinated and persistent series of cyber-attacks directed at its national 
security (Ashmore 2009). Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for networks and information
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integration at the Pentagon described the Estonian cyber-attacks as a possible “watershed in 
terms of widespread awareness of the vulnerability of modern society” (Shackelford 2009). 
While cyber-attacks have been used in other conflicts around the globe, such as in the Russia- 
Georgia War over South Ossetia or in the case of the Stuxnet worm, their use against Estonia 
was the first to demonstrate the profound vulnerability of states and potential damage to be done 
in the face of coordinated and prolonged attacks. Cyber security conflicts on the scale of the one 
in Estonia in 2007 are a relatively recent phenomenon, so this case was chosen because of its 
demonstration of contemporary problems for states in cyber warfare and the availability of 
literature and research given that several years have passed. After laying out the details of the 
cyber-attack on Estonia, this paper shall determine how each of the earlier elements discussed 
earlier may explain Estonia’s action (i.e., its decision to not use physical force). It will then 
consider a neorealist theory perspective as an alternative explanation to Estonian behavior before 
drawing final conclusions.
Case Background
The Estonian government’s decision to relocate a statue commemorating a Soviet soldier 
from WWII drew harsh criticism from Estonia’s large Russian minority and the Russian 
government itself “labeled the relocation as blasphemous” (McGavran 2009). While ethnic 
Russians in Estonia “rioted over the removal of what they viewed as a cherished monument to 
wartime sacrifice... in Moscow a Kremlin youth movement surrounded and attacked the 
Estonian embassy prompting protests from the U.S., NATO, and the E.U.” (Shackelford 2009).
The riots were accompanied by a previously unseen degree of Denial of Service attacks 
against the Estonian government, financial system, and communications firms (McGavran 2009). 
The cyber-attacks took many forms, but most were Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS)
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attacks aimed at shutting down Estonian websites (Economist May 10, 2007). One specific target 
was Estonian news agencies. The main media outlet in Estonia was so successfully attacked that 
it was forced to disconnect from international Internet connections entirely, “effectively gagging 
the Estonian news services from telling the world about the attack on their country” (Shackelford 
2009). Other general targets included banks and government websites while some were very 
focused. “Particular "ports" of particular mission-critical computers in, for example, the 
telephone exchanges were targeted” rendering emergency services unavailable by phone call 
(Kelsey 2008). The cyber-attacks that began on April 27 continued until May 10 when Estonia 
was on the verge of “complete digital collapse” that would have resulted in the “shut off many 
vital services and caused massive, widespread social disruptions” if they continued (Shackelford 
2009). Through emergency action, Estonia prevented permanent damage to its extensive IT 
infrastructure by coordinating with computer security specialists around the globe and its own 
Cyber Emergency Response Team.
The attacks were particularly painful for the nation because it was one of the most 
connected in Europe. In fact, Estonia is sometimes referred to as eStonia, given that it has 
“developed and used internet technology for voting, education, security and banking” (Ashmore 
2009). During the attacks analysis showed that “Internet traffic increased from 20,000 packets 
[units of data] to more than 4 million packets per second” (Shackelford 2009). All financial 
transactions and communication which typically took place over the internet between Estonia 
and other nations stopped. The Estonian Defense Minister compared the attacks with a traditional 
military blockade, but instead one which focused upon Estonia’s cyberspace (Ria Novosti June 
9, 2007).
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Russia was of course a prime suspect for the attacks and Estonians did not shy away from 
making such accusations. Though many may have thought that the Kremlin had a hand in 
organizing the attacks, the difficulty in proving that suspicion was immediately apparent.
Defense Minister Jaak Aaviksoo said “it is not possible to say without doubt that orders (for the 
blockade) came from the Kremlin, or that, indeed, a wish was expressed for such a thing there” 
(Ria Novosti June 9, 2007). And “due to the ambiguous nature of the internet and the use of fake 
internet protocol (IP) addresses, Estonians were unable to conclusively prove who initiated the 
cyber-attacks” (Ashmore 2009). An IP address links a computer on a network to a specific 
number that can be tracked to a location. But modifying this number is easy enough as to be 
standard practice for cyber-attackers. Even the home computer user may download software that 
masks an IP address as if it were in several other countries.
The implications for these attacks were significant for Estonia. While banking, 
communications, and some government functions were shut down, the actual costs of the attacks 
were by many accounts minor (Ashmore 2009; Shackelford 2009; Stapleton-Gray and 
Woodcock 2011). Estonia’s largest bank, Hansabank, estimated its initial losses at only one 
million dollars (NY Times May 29, 2007). What was much more significant was the first real 
demonstration to the global community of the potential destruction and vulnerability a modern 
state faces from cyber war (Ashmore 2009).
Estonia and NATO
The case involving Estonia was remarkable and a first in cyber warfare for several 
reasons. Estonia has been a member of NATO since 2004. Following the cyber siege on Estonia, 
the question was raised over whether the cyber-attack qualified as an armed attack and was 
therefore one in which the members of NATO should have come to Estonia’s aid (Economist
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July 1 2010). Though NATO ultimately determined the use of force not appropriate, the question 
of when use of force would become necessary is still considered within NATO. Indeed, the fact 
that the members of NATO and the international community have been unable to answer that 
question makes more likely that international law, and the North Atlantic Treaty as an example, 
appear lacking when faced with serious instances of cyber war. “Dealing with cyber-attacks has 
never been in NATO’s mandate” so perhaps NATO’s fumble in protecting Estonia (besides 
sending computer specialists) is understandable (Shackelford 2009). The real test may be if 
NATO adapts to include provisions for the growing threat of cyber war. NATO has since 
announced the placement of the Cybernetic Defense Center in Estonia, a strategic and symbolic 
move to counter cyber threats (Economist July 1, 2010).
NATO has been asking many difficult questions in recent years, especially since the 
attacks on Estonia.
A series of major cyber attacks on Estonian public and private institutions in April 
and May 2007 prompted NATO to take a harder look at its cyber defences. At 
their meeting in June 2007 Allied Defence Ministers agreed that urgent work was 
needed in this area. Pursuant to this agreement, NATO conducted a thorough 
assessment of its approach to cyber defence and reported back to Ministers in 
October 2007 (NATO Cyber Defence Policy and Activities).
One senior NATO official asked “If a member state’s communications centre is attacked with a
missile, you call it an act of war. So what do you call it if the same installation is disabled with a
cyberattack” (Economist May 10, 2007)? NATO has stepped up efforts to assist its member
nations in dealing with cyber-attacks rather than simply protecting its own IT infrastructure
(Ashmore 2009). Other signs of NATO’s serious consideration of the threat posed by cyber
warfare include a panel headed by Madeleine Albright which sought to find answers as to
whether the attack on Estonia constituted an armed one, or if a cyber-attack would bring all of
NATO into a war (Economist July 1 2010). The panel found that the next attack might be serious
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enough to invoke “mutual-defence provisions of Article 5” (Economist July 1 2010). Article 5 of 
the North Atlantic Treaty reads:
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or 
North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently 
they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the 
right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the 
Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking 
forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it 
deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the 
security of the North Atlantic area (North Atlantic Treaty 1949).
NATO’s definition of the use of force and its collective decision on when to use force has
important implications for the international community. Had the significant revision of
cyber war strategy taken place before the attacks on Estonia, NATO might have
responded with troops to punish the aggressors.
The above discussion on the topic of NATO’s role in case of Estonia’s cyber siege is
relevant to this paper for several reasons. First, it demonstrates the severity of the attacks made
on Estonia and the seriousness with which the international community has begun to take the
possibility of cyber warfare. And secondly, it allows the chance to address a possible criticism of
the case, which is that Estonia refrained from the use of physical force not because of any
conditions such as the uncertain extension of sovereignty, but because Russia is simply a much
more powerful adversary against whom making war would be unwise. This is a valid conclusion
which deserves consideration
Given that Estonia is a member of NATO, the balance of power (using a Neorealist lens) 
should traditional war break out is much more even and indeed tilted in Estonia’s favor. But 
Estonia only has NATO’s aid if it is the victim of armed attack. Estonia’s retaliation based upon 
its independent determination that it should treat a Russian cyber-attack as a use of force similar 
to a traditional armed attack would not have been one which NATO supported, especially since
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NATO did not think the attacks merited the use of force and had not yet devised a complete 
policy on assisting allies faced with cyber-attack. Thus Estonia seems to be left with the option 
of simply withstanding cyber-attack the best it can or defending itself through cyberspace, rather 
than launching an armed counter attack against Russia. While we may not be able to rule out 
Realism as an influence in shaping how Russia and Estonia behaved, it does not seem to be able 
to explain the cyber-attacks on its own. The Realist or Neorealist would note that Estonia did not 
go to war with Russia because of how much more powerful Russia is relative to Estonia. The 
question is rather whether Estonia could have gone to war and been justified in doing so to 
protect its interests.
Russia would have also been uncertain as to how NATO would respond to a severe 
cyber-attack against one of its members; some claim that the Estonian attacks represented a test 
by Russia (Shackelford 2009). If we assume the Russian state was behind the Estonian cyber- 
attacks, then Russia risked the outbreak of war first for a relatively trivial cause (i.e., outrage 
over the movement of a monument). Russia seems to have chosen a method of expressing its 
disapproval with Estonia in a way that has almost zero repercussions because of the problem of 
attribution. Thus a significant outcome of the Estonian cyber conflict when considered through a 
Realist or Neorealist lens, is that the questions raised by sovereignty, use of force, and attribution 
as influencing factors in state behavior cannot be dismissed. A solely Realist framework would 
explain the absence of a physical war based upon the balance of power between Russia and 
Estonia.
The Use o f Force
How would the approaches typically used to justify the use of force in war which were 
discussed earlier apply to the case of Estonia? The three approaches summarize the main schools
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of thought on how the use of force in war is defined under international law. The approaches are 
not simply alternatives that have since been suggested to better include cyber warfare, but are 
based upon actual laws which inform states’ legal action.
In briefly looking at those approaches as applied to the Estonia case we can exclude the 
first, which does not allow for cyber-attacks to be met with physical force, because the goal here 
is to find valid ways in which a state might be justified in using force and to then explain why 
Estonia did not. According to the first approach, Estonia could not retaliate against Russia using 
physical force no matter the severity of the cyber-attack originally aimed at Estonia. The second 
approach, which is target-based, may almost justify the use of force. It requires that a cyber- 
attack strike a state’s critical infrastructure. Although the Denial of Service attacks were a major 
disruption to Estonia, they did not threaten the lives of its citizens by, for example, 
contaminating fresh water supplies. I take critical infrastructure to mean that citizens’ lives will 
be in severe danger if such services are disabled or compromised. While Estonia’s ability to 
govern its people was extremely impaired, the lives of its citizens were not in imminent danger 
from the cyber-attacks. And the third approach allows force to be justified if the results of the 
cyber-attacks are the same as physical ones. Again, this approach fails because no physical 
damage was done as would have been the case if, for example, bombs were dropped. Thus we 
can see that justifying what happened to Estonia as an armed attack does not seem possible under 
current international law. Estonia could not legally justify a physical force response under 
international law, and it did not use one.
Attribution
The case of Estonian cyber war was also remarkable in how it emphasized to the 
international community just how troublesome the principle of attribution appears to be in cyber
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warfare. “The cyber attacks on Estonia demonstrated several disturbing realities...they showed 
that cyber attacks are extremely difficult to trace” making them only more attractive to 
belligerents wishing to conduct battle anonymously (McGavran 2009). An extensive 
examination of the trail hackers left behind only points back toward Russia in a general sense 
(Shackelford 2009). Not to the Kremlin, or organized crime, or any specific entity. While the 
Estonian government claimed to have proof that the first onslaught of cyber-attacks in 2007 
originated from Russian state computers, many more came from private computers located 
around the world (Davis 2007). The U.S. Cyber Emergency Response Team (CERT) was asked 
by NATO to analyze the source of the attacks. As government documents later revealed 
“politically motivated hacker gangs, not Russian security agencies” were to blame (UPI June 11, 
2007). In contrast to this assessment, a well-known Russian hacker SpORaw claimed “that the 
most efficient online attacks on Estonia could not have been carried out without the blessing of 
the Russian authorities” (Davis 2007). A final source is unclear and perhaps will never be 
known. Whatever organization executed the attacks, it is possible that Russian security agencies 
may have had a hand in offering them support or giving direction. What is important for the 
purposes of this paper, however, is that attribution for the attacks remained ambiguous and the 
example is useful for examining state behavior.
A collection of circumstantial evidence suggesting Russian culpability is the closest one 
can get to identification of a belligerent. The Russian government did not seem opposed to the 
attacks though we cannot know its active role. While Estonia was approaching a complete 
shutdown of its critical internet systems, Vladimir Putin was speaking at a parade where he said 
“those who are trying today to ... desecrate memorials to war heroes are insulting their own 
people, sowing discord and new distrust between states and peoples” (Shackelford 2009). Thus,
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despite a hunch on the part of the Estonian government as to who led the attacks, it is clear 
Estonia could not definitively attribute blame to another state. And given this, Estonia did not 
choose to use physical force in response to cyber-attack.
Following the attacks on Estonia the Russian government refused to help track down the 
origin of the botnets, or to conduct an investigation of the alleged hackers under the Mutual 
Legal Assistance Treaty which both states had signed (Shackelford 2009). The only conviction to 
come out of criminal investigations, which Estonia carried out following the attacks, was of a 
Russian student living in Estonia who attacked the website of Estonian Prime Minister Ansip and 
posted a fake letter of apology for the movement of the statue (Shackelford 2009). The student 
was required to pay a fine only.
Sovereignty
What may be less clear through the Estonian cyber-attacks is the extent to which Estonia 
was able or unable to determine if its sovereignty was violated. Estonia was certainly made 
unable to control its online affairs. Is outside communication a sovereign right in a globally 
connected world? Perhaps in an age of digital communication where a nation’s ability to survive 
depends upon participation in the global economy an argument can be made for that. Losing the 
ability to communicate internally, however, and govern effectively does seem like a serious 
violation of sovereignty. It does not seem, however, that Estonia was able to avoid any of the 
uncertainties discussed regarding sovereignty in the realm of cyberspace.
Even if international law codified the extension of state sovereignty in cyberspace, there 
are other requirements for retaliation made necessary by sovereignty. Retaliation or self-defense 
requires justification based on aggression. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter reads “all members 
shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
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integrity or political independence of any state” (UN Charter). The document is not unclear on 
the importance of state sovereignty. For a nation-state to violate another’s sovereignty in 
retaliation for cyber-attack requires evidence of a first violation (perhaps penetrating internal 
networks). But what constitutes an extension of state sovereignty has yet to be established 
regarding the domain of cyberspace. Thus states are able to conduct a variety of operations in 
cyberspace without upsetting the standards the international community has for the inviolability 
of state sovereignty.
Conclusions
As cyber warfare becomes an increasingly integral part of future militaries and potential 
conflict, it will become evident whether states will ultimately find using physical force in 
response to cyber-attacks feasible and to their advantage. This study began in an effort to 
determine what factors account for states’ reluctance to use physical force in response to cyber- 
attacks. After selecting attribution, international law, and sovereignty as main elements within 
the literature to explain state use of force, this paper reflected on these factors within a Neorealist 
theoretical framework and as they apply to cyberspace. The study then considered the Estonian 
cyber-attacks in 2007 as a case study to further explore scholar’s arguments.
The first research question asked: Does a nation-state’s use of cyber warfare tactics 
against another state result in the use of physical force by the attacked state if the extension of 
sovereignty in cyberspace remains unclear? This paper argued that the extension of sovereignty 
in cyberspace is unclear, but that the degree of ambiguity was not as high as with the other 
elements such as the use of force in international law. While states have yet to define on an 
individual level or through international consensus what sovereignty in cyberspace entails, or to 
act on what they interpret as a violation of their sovereignty in cyberspace, there may be reason
37
to classify a disruption of state internal and external digital communications as a violation. In the 
case of Estonia, the degree of government paralysis supports such a view. Yet Estonia did not 
use physical force to retaliate against the Russian government or non-state actors. Thus the 
ambiguity of state sovereignty supported an explanation of why Estonia did not respond to 
cyber-attacks using physical force. Estonia’s decision not to use physical force may be the result 
of other factors, such as the relative strength of Russia compared to Estonia.
The second question asked: Does a nation-state’s use of cyber warfare tactics against 
another state result in the use of physical force by the attacked state if definitions on the use of 
force in international law remain undetermined? Through research it became fairly clear that no 
international laws fully address cyber warfare specifically. While the Estonian cyber-attacks 
have since spurred organizations such as NATO to prepare a legal framework for future 
confrontations in cyberspace, the body of international law was certainly less than sufficient to 
act as a guide for state action in the case of Estonia. The approaches, such as those by analogy, 
used to justify the use of force in traditional warfare were unable to justify the use of force in 
cyber warfare. Thus international law was shown to support an explanation of why Estonia did 
not respond to cyber-attacks using physical force.
The third asked: Does a nation-state’s use of cyber warfare tactics against another 
state result in the use of physical force by the attacked state if the attacked state is unable to 
attribute blame for the attacks to a particular source? The problem of attribution proved to be one 
of the greatest challenges facing states who engage in cyber warfare or are the victims of cyber- 
attack. The source of cyber-attack is incredibly difficult to pinpoint. In the case of Estonia, 
experts disagree over the involvement of the Kremlin in executing the attacks. The ability to 
conclusively attribute blame for an attack as is typical in traditional warfare is crucial in
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mounting a counter-attack. Thus the problem of attribution was shown to support an explanation 
of why Estonia did not respond to cyber-attacks using physical force.
Each of the above elements and theories attempted to answer the research questions, and 
seem to offer valid explanations for why states would forego the use of physical force in 
response to cyber-attack. By considering neorealism, which has been so prominent in the last 
century, additional points can be made to test the theory’s ability to explain the behavior of a 
state such as Estonia in cyberspace. The neorealist focuses upon the structure of the international 
system (with an emphasis on bi-polarity) and the laws which govern states as elements which 
explain state behavior. There are many treaties which seek to clarify when the use of force by a 
state is justified, thus maintaining security because states understand expectations rather than 
trying to navigate chaos. Given this fact, if neorealism remains influential states should seek to 
come to new agreements specifically tailored to maintaining security in cyberspace. Since 
nation-states have not yet moved to do this, it may prove that neorealist thought has been 
foregone in favor of traditional realism’s focus on independent state interest rather than 
collective security. Because the world order is not one dominated by two competing powers any 
longer, it would seem that neorealism has a diminished relevance. But because war in cyberspace 
may occur between two states only and be targeted so effectively as to not affect neighboring 
states, bi-polarity remains alive in a curious way that might benefit further study.
Limitations and Options for Further Research
This paper is limited by several factors, most notably the relatively recent development of 
cyber warfare as a modern occurrence and the small amount of literature devoted to the topic in 
relation to traditional warfare. This study would be strengthened by additional cases as well. A 
case in which the relative power differences between the two nation-states were equal, rather
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than Russia’s overwhelming dominance when compared to Estonian military might that 
influenced behavior in this paper’s case study, would also be useful in isolating factors such as 
attribution and international law to explain state behavior. A limitation of cases will not likely 
last however, as cyber warfare shows no signs of becoming less relevant or less useful for states 
in the future.
There are additional theories that may be useful in explaining state behavior in cyber 
warfare besides neorealism and realism. An interesting possibility would be to consider theories 
of terrorism to see if the asymmetry of cyberspace may cause states to behave as non-state 
actors. And there are many additional avenues for research of non-state actors and their role in 
cyber warfare, including cyber-terrorism and the cyber-criminal organizations which sell their 
services to assist in executing some of the attacks that occur around the globe. This study 
represents only a small portion of the difficult questions being asked about the future role of 
cyber warfare. Countless other studies will surely follow.
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Appendix I-Glossary of Terms
Botnet: “A network of computers that have been forced to operate on the commands of an 
unauthorized remote user, usually without the knowledge of their owners or operators. This 
network of “robot” computers is then used to commit attacks on other systems. A botnet usually 
has one or more controller computers, which are being directly employed by the operator behind 
the botnet to give orders to the secretly controlled devices. The computers on botnets are 
frequently referred to as “zombies.” Botnets are used, among other purposes, to conduct floods 
of messages (see DDOS)” (Clarke 2010).
Cyber-attack: The use of information systems and networks to disable or disrupt the operations 
of a nation’s infrastructure and/or its public and private institutions. A cyber-attack is perhaps 
analogous to a pistol in that a pistol may be used by soldiers, criminals, or citizens; and the pistol 
may be pointed at any of the three in a variety of combinations. A cyber-attack is merely a 
means. This paper is interested in cyber-attacks directed at states by states for the sake of causing 
disruption, harm, or damage toward achieving political objectives. Passive monitoring of a 
state’s cyberspace for the purpose of espionage is not relevant here, nor are cybercriminal 
organizations and citizen hackers.
Cyberspace: “A domain characterized by the use of electronics and the electromagnetic 
spectrum to store, modify, and exchange date via networked systems and associated physical 
infrastructures” (U.S. DoD, 2006). The internet, easily accessible by a home computer may be 
what immediately springs to mind, but cyberspace includes all electronic information stored and 
accessible via a network of computers, whether a private set of servers for a Fortune 500 
company or a military database.
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Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS): “A basic cyber war technique...in which an Internet 
site, a server, or router is flooded with more requests for data than the site can respond to or 
process. The result of such a flood is that legitimate traffic cannot access the site and the site is in 
effect shut down. Botnets are used to conduct such attacks, thus “distributing” the attack over 
thousands of originating computers acting in unison” (Clarke 2010).
Espionage: “Intelligence activities designed to collect information, access to which another 
nation (or other actor) is attempting to deny. Cyber espionage is the unauthorized entry by a 
nation-state onto networks, computers, or databases of another nation for purposes of copying 
and exfiltrating sensitive information” (Clarke 2010).
Hacker: “Originally, a skilled user of software or hardware who can adapt systems to do things 
other than their intended or original use. In common parlance, however, the term has been used 
to denote someone who uses skills to gain access to a computer or network without 
authorization. As a verb, “to hack” means to break into a system” (Clarke 2010).
Internet Service Provider (ISP): “A corporation (or government agency) that provides the 
wired or wireless connectivity from a user’s home, office, or mobile computer to the Internet. In 
the U.S. there are numerous small, regional ISPs and a handful of national ISPs. Often ISPs are 
also telephone companies or cable providers” (Clarke 2010).
Internet: “The global interconnected network of networks intended for general access for the 
transmission of e-mails, the sharing of information on wbepages, and so on. Networks may yse 
the same software and transmission protocols, but not be part of the Internet if they are designed 
to be closed off from the global interconnected system. Such closed networks are referred to as 
“intranets.” Often there are controlled connections between intranets and the Internet. Sometimes 
there are unintentional connections” (Clarke 2010).
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Server: “A computer usually accessed by many others, in order to interact with information 
stored on it, such as webpages or e-mails. Typically, servers are meant to operate without 
constant human monitoring. Routers, which direct the movement of Internet traffic, are a type of 
server” (Clarke 2010).
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